Divine Infinity in St. Gregory of Nyssa’s To Ablabius
by Sean Fagan
Divine infinity is a mysterious subject. Properly speaking, much ink has been spilled trying to define what it is, and exactly what it does. Unfortunately, this paper, as with others, will bring us no closer to solving that problem. Despite this inability, this paper will attempt to portray two things: What divine infinity, in terms of ontology, means for Gregory of Nyssa, and the relative importance for his thought. We will examine the arguments set forth by Nyssa in his work To Ablabius, and through the use of pertinent secondary sources, attempt to draw out the implications of divine infinity for Nyssa. Before going into the particulars of Nyssa’s thought, a short history and definition of “infinity” will be presented first.
What is meant by the word “infinity,” especially in relation to the subject of divinity? Catholic theologian Leo Sweeney, in his work Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought, charts the history of infinity through a number of successive and influential thinkers. For our purposes, the concentration will be on Aristotle and Neo-Platonism.1
For Aristotle, infinity is a negative quality. It is such because of its unintelligibility. In Aristotle’s mind, it is imperative that a form possess qualities that allow it to be intelligible and perceived by the mind. Forms and matter must have measureable quantities attached or applicable to it that allows it to be known and measured. These qualities constitute finitude. Therefore, forms that do not possess these qualities are unintelligible to the mind, and thus have a quality of infinity. In other words, “infinity is linked with a state of unintelligibility, mere potentiality, and imperfection.”2 Furthermore, for Aristotle, since infinity means immeasurability and imperfection, any use of the term in reference to God is impossible.3
Aristotle’s understanding of infinity is the standard definition until the developments instituted under Plotinus and Neo-Platonism in the third century. The major innovation of Plotinus is to specifically attribute infinity to God himself. In opposition to Aristotle, Plotinus regards the divine substance to be infinite in itself, and not limited to descriptions of God’s power.4
More specifically, in Plotinus’ understanding, unintelligibility, while usually considered a detriment (similar to Aristotle and the relationship between infinity and unintelligibility), is not necessarily so in regards to divine substance. For Plotinus, the premise that divine being is transcendent and unintelligible allows him to say that God is “other” in comparison, and therefore, infinite. As Sweeney puts it: “By this transcendence, [God] is infinite, and such infinity is aligned with absolute perfection and actual excellence.”5
Thus having gone over the antecedents of divine infinity, what does this mean for Nyssa’s teaching on the matter? First, it establishes the philosophical heritage from which both Eunomius and Gregory draw. As Orthodox theologian David Hart notes, “What Gregory understands ‘infinity’ to mean when predicated of God…is very much…what Plotinus understood it to mean in regard to the One: incomprehensibility, absolute power, simplicity, eternity.”6
Second, although Nyssa draws heavily from the Greek philosophical tradition, it does not mean that he is bound to it strictly as others. For Nyssa, the Christian revelation of “Father, Son and Spirit” is not only the basis of his metaphysics, but also the reconstitution of prior metaphysics.7 In Nyssa, the fact of God as “Father, Son, and Spirit” and the notion of divine infinity that is predicated of it, is the distinguishing marker between the system of Eunomius and himself.8 Therefore, it is on this point that Gregory’s metaphysics takes a different track than the path of Plotinus, Ablabius, and Eunomius. To that effect, Nyssa’s engagement with Ablabius.
In this work, Nyssa is addressing the argument that, just as there is a one to one relationship of individuation and nature in human beings, there is a proper parallel in Christianity; for every instantiation of divinity, there is to be regarded one singular unit of divinity. In short, this comes to mean three instantiations of divinity (“Father, Son, and Spirit”) as equaling three Gods. Nyssa answers in the negative to this premise.9
His first response is to argue that there is a misusage and misunderstanding of terms. Nyssa agrees that terms help avoid confusion, for “when we call someone something, we do not name him after his nature because we do not want the commonality of the name to produce any confusion.”10 Therefore, there is the proper distinction through the use of names. However, while there is distinction made between individuals, there is only one nature common to all the members. Nyssa explains that human nature “is single, since this is self-unified and a completely undivided monad, and is not increased by addition nor decreased by subtraction.” Even more so, “just as we speak of a people, a public, an army, and a senate, all singularly, but conceive of each in the plural, so too in a more precise form of speech one would properly speak of a single man, even if those make known in the same nature are a plurality.”11 For Nyssa, this premise allows a theoretical correspondence between human nature and divine nature; just as one is, so is the other. Therefore, having established the premise, Gregory moves into an explanation of divinity per se.
For Nyssa, the divine nature is unknowable; at best, he can only offers words of description, and not the thing in itself: “And every name, whether is has been discovered by human convention or has been handed down by the Scriptures, we say expresses our thoughts about the divine nature, but does not include the signification of the nature itself.”12 What this means for Gregory’s argument is that while the nature of God is unknowable, his effects are, and it is through the effects (the activities) of God that the equality of Father, Son, and Spirit in the arena of divinity can be established.13
Nyssa is addressing the contention that each divine person performs a singular action; just as he earlier argued in reference to human person as one unit according to nature, he must again answer against a conceptualization that the divine persons, in their activity, mirror human activity: one person, one act.14 For Nyssa, the issue is two-fold. On the one hand, he seeks to maintain the unity of the persons and the unity of the acts; without one or the other, his argument fails. On the other hand, by stressing that divinity is a mutual act of the Trinity, he can also argue for the infinity of Father, Son, and Spirit
As regards infinity, a number of points will be drawn out. The first is that Nyssa spends a great deal of this piece dealing with the interplay between the divine persons and the mutual, singular activity by which all three interact with creation. Why is that? One reason is that divinity constitutes an activity of God, rather than a description of nature. .
You see this on page six, where after having once again defended the mutuality of activity, he launches into an assertion of the incomprehensibility and infinity of the divine nature.
For we, believing that the divine nature is limitless and incomprehensible, conceive no comprehension of it, but stipulate that the nature be contemplated as infinite in every sense. What is completely infinite is not defined in one respect and in another not; infinity escapes definition by any reasoning. Thus, what is beyond definition is no defined by name at all. In order to maintain the concept of the unlimited in the case of the divine nature, we say that the divine is above every name. “Divinity” is one of the names. But it is not possible to reckon the same thing to be a name and above every name.15
Divine infinity is the high point of his argument, as he notes in the next paragraph the possible objection of using the appellation of “divinity” to nature against his previous argument of activity, then launching forth into a similar argument from the beginning, describing how multiplicity and plurality do not add or subtract from the nature of a thing.16 He has already discussed that divine nature is simple and one substantially, as well simple and one in the Trinity’s activity towards creation and humankind. Nyssa’s argument would an endless series of circularities and repetitions if it did not return to its foundation: that God---Father, Son, and Holy Spirit---is ultimately a mystery towards us and our understanding.
What does this ultimately mean for Nyssa? Divine infinity establishes the crucial distinction between God and creation. As Catholic theologian Robert Sokolowski has argued in his work, the ontological difference between God and creation is what distinguishes Christian metaphysics and traditional Greek ontology. 17 And as theologian Hans von Balthasar has pointed out, this is Nyssa’s starting point: “Every time he undertakes a development of the fundamentals of his metaphysics, Gregory begins from the irreducible opposition between God and creature.”18
The ontological distinction maintains the balance between the God and creation in that it does not allow for confusion between the two, and for Nyssa, it is necessary for the contemplation of God.19 As writer Robert Brightman argues, in his battle with Eunomius, Nyssa must argue against Eunomius’ claim that man is able to know God in his essence, which in result “brings God down to manageable portions so that [God] can be totally defined by man.”20 Therefore, to maintain both his doctrine against Eunomius et al and a sense of mystery about God, Nyssa must have recourse to divine infinity, since it allows him an ontological basis in conceptualizing God.21
Finally, for Nyssa, the infinity of God is necessary because the contemplation of God is without end. As alluded to by Brightman, the controversy with Eunomius hinges in part on the subject of the human person’s intelligibility in regards to God. A finite God is ultimately knowable by a lesser, finite human being—an implication that runs counter to Nyssa’s premises. Therefore, God must be infinite in order to properly contemplate him.22
For Nyssa, divine infinity performs a number of functions. First, it allows for a true distinction to be made between Greek and Christian metaphysics. Whereas in Greek metaphysics infinity takes on the characteristics of (essentially) non-being, divine infinity, as articulated by Nyssa, is given shape; in other words, the Trinity and the relations therein, constitute infinity and nothing else.23 Divine infinity, newly re-defined, allows for the possibility of new avenues of approach to the Trinitarian mystery.
Second, divine infinity for Nyssa allows God to be God. In To Ablabius, Nyssa’s consistent use of the Scriptures is not only for rigorous argumentation, but also as an appeal to witness. The infinity of God allows the Trinitarian members to function as one in act, and one in purpose. Therefore, divine infinity “protects” God’s freedom to act and to be.