The Anonymous God Tradition in the Pre-Nicene Writers
Dr. Edgar G. Foster
Lactantius was an early church writer who lived from 250-325 CE. Christian, Jewish and pagan literature probably shaped Lactantian apophaticism (i.e. negative theology). Philo Judaeus (50 BCE-20 CE) affirmed God’s namelessness, thereby setting the stage for post-apostolic Christians who espoused analogous beliefs. This study proposes that the pre-Nicene writers articulated a number of distinct reasons for denying that God has a proper name or even needs one. This investigation will now enumerate some of their stated motivations below which may not exhaust their rationale for adopting the stance that God is nameless but still contributes to our historical understanding of this matter:
(1) The pre-Nicenes (ecclesiastical thinkers who wrote prior to the Council of Nicea) were acquainted with the Gnostic conscription of the Tetragrammaton (YHWH or Iao) in the context of magic ceremonies. Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and Justin Martyr all show awareness of this Gnostic practice in their polemico-apologetical treatises that are designed to confute heresy.1 Cyril Richardson suggests that Justin refuses to ascribe a name to God for this very reason.2 Discussing baptismal procedures in his day, the Martyr avers: “For no one can utter the name of the ineffable God; and if any one dares to say that there is a name, he raves with a hopeless madness.”3 Adherents of Judaism evidently no longer pronounced the divine name by the third century BCE.4 In a manner akin to Philo, they universally believed the Name (Ha-shem) is unspeakable or incomprehensible.5 Furthermore, Jewish worshipers of YHWH generally thought that vocalizing God’s name was a sign of irreverence (Sanh. 7.5; 10.1). Tradition appears to state that during the Second Temple period only Jewish priests were permitted to utter the quadrilateral name of God at certain places or during ordained times (Mishnah Sotah 7:6; Tamid 7:2; Ecclesiasticus 50:20) although devout adherents of Judaism certainly employed some form of the divine name in casual greetings elsewhere.6 In this regard, Josephus apparently called the Tetragrammaton that “hair-raising name.”7 On the other hand, the pre-Nicenes not only chose to avoid pronouncing God’s covenantal designation (YHWH) but they customarily affirmed the divine innominability or namelessness concept, thereby excluding a proper name for God the Father (Dialogus cum Tryphone 127). What were then contemporary Gnostic practices may have shaped early Christian view of attributing a proper name to God the Father.
(2) Early Christian writers considered it less problematic to say what God is not than to say what God is.8 Hence, they reasoned that it is impossible to predicate literal attributes of God the Father such that any predicating term (F) discloses God’s quiddity (i.e. whatness) or F-ness.9 Apophaticism largely infiltrated Christianity by means of Platonic thought.10 Both pre and post-Nicene thinkers commonly quote Timaeus 28C to substantiate the belief that one cannot declare what God is in Himself.11 McClelland rigorously traces the historical connections between Platonic thought and Christian apophaticism as well as the divine innominability doctrine. He notes that the Supreme Being in Middle Platonism “transcends the whole polarity of A and not-A.”12 It is not just that one is able to conclude that God is A because God is not-A; the Platonists contended that God is beyond naming or that he is ineffable (Didaskalikos 10). And it was in this cultural environment that Christians formulated their own type of negative theology. It must be conceded, however, that Origen of Alexandria (in opposition to Celsus) maintained that humans are able to comprehend and describe God in the sense that familiarity with divine attributes may conceivably guide one who heeds God’s truth toward a partial knowledge and understanding of the deity. More specifically, Origen explains that it is factually possible for the Word of God (understood as Christ in this context) to bring about understanding of the divine insofar as human nature permits.13 Origen thus circumspectly qualifies in what sense he believes that one can know or comprehend God:
But if you take the phrase to mean that it is possible to represent by words something of God’s attributes, in order to lead the hearer by the hand, as it were, and so enable him to comprehend something of God, so far as attainable by human nature, then there is no absurdity in saying that “He can be described by name.”14
Origen affirms that there is a sense in which creatures are able to describe or comprehend God. Such comprehension is not exhaustive but relative (i.e. to a degree). Therefore, the often heard maxim “God may be apprehended, but not comprehended”15 probably needs to be qualified.16 Origen indicates that rational creatures are able to describe or comprehend God—to an extent.
(3) Certain pre-Nicenes argue that divine appellations are only human vehicles for addressing God.17 Terms of address for God do not say anything significative concerning the Father’s quiddity; spatio-temporal bound language is not capable of unfolding the Christian object of worship with respect to his essence. Strictly speaking, the ancient ecclesiastical writers conceive divine names as manifestations of God’s benevolence.18 Because of his unbounded or infinite compassion, the Father permits humans to use divine “forms of address” (prosrh,seij) rather than “names” (o;nomata).19 The grace afforded rational creatures to call God “Father” obtains in view of our creaturely weaknesses.
- Justin Martyr reasons that God does not have a proper name since bearing a self-marking designation seems to imply that a name-giver preceded the one so designated.20 Yet there is no individual substance or entity temporally prior to God the Father: he is from eternity to eternity (Revelation 15:3).21 Therefore, the Father is nameless. Justin might fail to consider the logical possibility that God’s proper name could be coextensive with his nature. That would obviate the need for the Father to have a name-giver. But Justin possibly believes that atemporal existence logically necessitates or entails deific innominability (= divine namelessness). However, the name of God the Father is probably not accidental but essential to God’s being (Exodus 3:12-15).22 The divine name and the God who bears it cannot be ontologically separated.
- Another pre-Nicene line of reasoning is that only created entities have names: “He has no name, for everything which has a name is kindred to things created.”23 Some early church writers openly reason that uncreated entities like the Father do not require designations: (a) All individual uncreated (primary) substances do not require designations; (b) God the Father is an individual uncreated (primary) substance; (c) therefore, God the Father does not need a self-designation. Clement of Alexandria thinks that the categories of genus or species do not apply to deity (Stromata 5.81-82). Consequently, one does not need to differentiate God from other divine beings since there is no divine genus or species. Moreover, the pre-Nicenes generally contend that names circumscribe the substances which they designate. To define an entity or substance implies that it has both genus and species (e.g. “Socrates is a man”).24 It is fittingly circumscribable. But the Father is infinite (= without genus or species); hence, the Father is anonymous (Cohortatio ad Graecos 20-21). The pre-Nicenes also believed that God’s essence is unknowable since God is unique (sui generis). They ultimately argued that it is impossible to circumscribe God by means of terms or concepts since one cannot essentially apply concepts to a being that does not possess genus, species or differentiae. There is only one authentic inestimable Creator and Father of all.25 Other objects of reverence are merely purported gods (Adversus Marcionem 5.7, 5.11; Adversus Hermogenem 4). If there is only one God, then (Cyprian and Justin reason) it is unnecessary to name this deity:
Neither must you ask the name of God. God is His name. Among those there is need of names where a multitude is to be distinguished by the appropriate characteristics of appellations. To God who alone is, belongs the whole name of God; therefore He is one, and He in His entirety is everywhere diffused.26
- The Father has not published his proper name.27 Tertullian maintains that humans only know God as “Father” because Christ explained his Father (John 1:18) and taught his disciples how to pray (Luke 11:2).28 God the Father has not revealed his proper name: it is not even possible for the Father to disclose a name that delineates his essence since human language does not have the capability to define or express that which is perpetually infinite (semper immensus).29 For this reason, knowledge of the Father’s proper name is unattainable. Early Latin and Greek Christian thinkers insist that God has not deigned to reveal his consecrated self-designation. These six factors do not exhaust their reasons for affirming God’s anonymity; however, they do seem to epitomize the primary stated motivations undergirding the pre-Nicene adherence to the divine innominability concept.
